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Heinz Guderian. Heinz Wilhelm Guderian (German: [haɪnts ˈvɪlhɛlm ɡuˈdeːʁi.an]; 17 June 1888 – 14 May 1954) was a German general during World War II who, after the war, became a successful memoirist. An early pioneer and advocate of the "blitzkrieg" approach, he played a central role in the development of the panzer division concept.
Heinz Günther Guderian (23 August 1914 – 25 September 2004) was a German officer in the Wehrmacht and later a major general and Inspector of Panzer Troops in the West German Bundeswehr and NATO.
Panzer Group Guderian (German: Panzergruppe Guderian) was formed on 5 June 1940 and named after its commander, general Heinz Guderian. In early June 1940, after reaching the English Channel following the breakthrough in the Ardennes, the Panzergruppe Guderian was formed from the XIX Army Corps, and thrust deep into France, cutting off the ...
However, German General Heinz Guderian managed to maneuver the large tank force through the Ardennes and was ready to strike.
Achtung – Panzer! (English: "Attention, Tank!" or, more idiomatically, "Beware the Tank!"), written by Heinz Guderian, a German World War II tank commander, is a book on the application of motorized warfare. First published in 1937, it expounds a new kind of warfare: the concentrated use of tanks, with infantry and air force in close support ...
Panzer Leader (German: Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, literally "Memories of a Soldier") is an autobiography by Heinz Guderian. The book, written during his imprisonment by the Allies after the war, describes Guderian's service in the Panzer arm of the Heer before and during World War II. The most prominent English language version is the 1952 ...
Before receiving his "gift" of a Polish estate, Guderian, as Inspector General for the Panzers, had been opposed to the plans for Unternehmen Zitadelle, which was to lead to the Battle of Kursk, one of Germany's worst defeats of the war; after receiving the estate, Guderian did a 180° turn about as to the wisdom of the operation. [26]
This was made clear to the German Armed Forces' high command when General Heinz Guderian presented them with intelligence on the impending Soviet assault, and on a comparison of strength; the German general claimed that the Red Army had an advantage of eleven to one in infantry, seven to one in armor and twenty to one in artillery. [129]