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The one-shot deviation principle (also known as single-deviation property [1]) is the principle of optimality of dynamic programming applied to game theory. [2] It says that a strategy profile of a finite multi-stage extensive-form game with observed actions is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if and only if there exist no profitable single ...
Repeated game. In game theory, a repeated game (or iterated game) is an extensive form game that consists of a number of repetitions of some base game (called a stage game ). The stage game is usually one of the well-studied 2-person games. Repeated games capture the idea that a player will have to take into account the impact of their current ...
Prisoner's dilemma. The prisoner's dilemma is a game theory thought experiment that involves two rational agents, each of whom can cooperate for mutual benefit or betray their partner ("defect") for individual reward. This dilemma was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950 while they worked at the RAND Corporation. [1]
The ultimatum game is a game that has become a popular instrument of economic experiments. An early description is by Nobel laureate John Harsanyi in 1961. [1] One player, the proposer, is endowed with a sum of money. The proposer is tasked with splitting it with another player, the responder (who knows what the total sum is).
The original Folk Theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated game. This result was called the Folk Theorem because it was widely known among game theorists in the 1950s, even though no one had published it. Friedman's (1971) Theorem concerns the payoffs of certain subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPE) of ...
The public goods game is a standard of experimental economics. In the basic game, subjects secretly choose how many of their private tokens to put into a public pot. The tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor (greater than one and less than the number of players, N) and this "public good" payoff is evenly divided among players.
For finitely repeated games, if a stage game has only one unique Nash equilibrium, the subgame perfect equilibrium is to play without considering past actions, treating the current subgame as a one-shot game. An example of this is a finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma game. The Prisoner's dilemma gets its name from a situation that contains ...
Critics of this theory point out that bullet placement is a very significant factor, but is only generally used in such one-shot-stop calculations, covering shots to the torso. [ citation needed ] Others contend that the importance of "one-shot stop" statistics is overstated, pointing out that most gun encounters do not involve a "shoot once ...