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Repeated games allow for the study of the interaction between immediate gains and long-term incentives. A finitely repeated game is a game in which the same one-shot stage game is played repeatedly over a number of discrete time periods, or rounds. Each time period is indexed by 0 < t ≤ T where T is the total number of periods.
A game can have more than one Nash equilibrium. Even if the equilibrium is unique, it might be weak: a player might be indifferent among several strategies given the other players' choices. It is unique and called a strict Nash equilibrium if the inequality is strict so one strategy is the unique best response:
Because of this, all games prior to the last subgame will also play the Nash equilibrium to maximize their single-period payoffs. If a stage-game in a finitely repeated game has multiple Nash equilibria, subgame perfect equilibria can be constructed to play non-stage-game Nash equilibrium actions, through a "carrot and stick" structure.
In game theory, folk theorems are a class of theorems describing an abundance of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games ( Friedman 1971 ). [1] The original Folk Theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated game. This result was called the Folk Theorem because it was widely known among game ...
In game theory, " guess 2 3 of the average " is a game that explores how a player’s strategic reasoning process takes into account the mental process of others in the game. [1] In this game, players simultaneously select a real number between 0 and 100, inclusive. The winner of the game is the player (s) who select a number closest to ...
Stackelberg competition. The Stackelberg leadership model is a strategic game in economics in which the leader firm moves first and then the follower firms move sequentially (hence, it is sometimes described as the "leader-follower game"). It is named after the German economist Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg who published Marktform und ...
According to Walker, [3] Nash's bargaining solution was shown by John Harsanyi to be the same as Zeuthen's solution [4] of the bargaining problem. The Nash bargaining game is a simple two-player game used to model bargaining interactions. In the Nash bargaining game, two players demand a portion of some good (usually some amount of money).
The dynamics of equilibrium selection for repeated games can be illustrated with a two-period game. With every action from the players in one period, a new subgame is initiated based on that action profile. For the Nash Equilibrium of the entire game, a subgame perfect equilibrium of every game is required.