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Repeated games allow for the study of the interaction between immediate gains and long-term incentives. A finitely repeated game is a game in which the same one-shot stage game is played repeatedly over a number of discrete time periods, or rounds. Each time period is indexed by 0 < t ≤ T where T is the total number of periods.
A game can have more than one Nash equilibrium. Even if the equilibrium is unique, it might be weak: a player might be indifferent among several strategies given the other players' choices. It is unique and called a strict Nash equilibrium if the inequality is strict so one strategy is the unique best response:
In game theory, folk theorems are a class of theorems describing an abundance of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games ( Friedman 1971 ). [1] The original Folk Theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated game. This result was called the Folk Theorem because it was widely known among game ...
The ultimatum game is a game that has become a popular instrument of economic experiments. An early description is by Nobel laureate John Harsanyi in 1961. [1] One player, the proposer, is endowed with a sum of money. The proposer is tasked with splitting it with another player, the responder (who knows what the total sum is).
Subgame perfect equilibrium. In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium (or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. Informally, this means that at any point in ...
The Nash equilibrium was the most common agreement (mode), but the average (mean) agreement was closer to a point based on expected utility. [11] In real-world negotiations, participants often first search for a general bargaining formula, and then only work out the details of such an arrangement, thus precluding the disagreement point and ...
Stackelberg competition. The Stackelberg leadership model is a strategic game in economics in which the leader firm moves first and then the follower firms move sequentially (hence, it is sometimes described as the "leader-follower game"). It is named after the German economist Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg who published Marktform und ...
The dynamics of equilibrium selection for repeated games can be illustrated with a two-period game. With every action from the players in one period, a new subgame is initiated based on that action profile. For the Nash Equilibrium of the entire game, a subgame perfect equilibrium of every game is required.