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A game can have more than one Nash equilibrium. Even if the equilibrium is unique, it might be weak: a player might be indifferent among several strategies given the other players' choices. It is unique and called a strict Nash equilibrium if the inequality is strict so one strategy is the unique best response:
Repeated games allow for the study of the interaction between immediate gains and long-term incentives. A finitely repeated game is a game in which the same one-shot stage game is played repeatedly over a number of discrete time periods, or rounds. Each time period is indexed by 0 < t ≤ T where T is the total number of periods.
In game theory, folk theorems are a class of theorems describing an abundance of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games ( Friedman 1971 ). [1] The original Folk Theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated game. This result was called the Folk Theorem because it was widely known among game ...
A game modeled after the iterated prisoner's dilemma is a central focus of the 2012 video game Zero Escape: Virtue's Last Reward and a minor part in its 2016 sequel Zero Escape: Zero Time Dilemma. In The Mysterious Benedict Society and the Prisoner's Dilemma by Trenton Lee Stewart , the main characters start by playing a version of the game and ...
Subgame perfect equilibrium. In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium (or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. Informally, this means that at any point in ...
The Nash equilibrium was the most common agreement (mode), but the average (mean) agreement was closer to a point based on expected utility. [11] In real-world negotiations, participants often first search for a general bargaining formula, and then only work out the details of such an arrangement, thus precluding the disagreement point and ...
The group's total payoff is maximized when everyone contributes all of their tokens to the public pool. However, the Nash equilibrium in this game is simply zero contributions by all; if the experiment were a purely analytical exercise in game theory it would resolve to zero contributions because any rational agent does best contributing zero, regardless of whatever anyone else does.
The dynamics of equilibrium selection for repeated games can be illustrated with a two-period game. With every action from the players in one period, a new subgame is initiated based on that action profile. For the Nash Equilibrium of the entire game, a subgame perfect equilibrium of every game is required.